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Abstract
Privacy-preserving machine learning algorithms are crucial for the increasingly common set-
ting in which personal data, such as medical or financial records, are analyzed. We provide
general techniques to produce privacy-preserving approximations of classifiers learned via (regu-
larized) empirical risk minimization (ERM). These algorithms are private under the ǫ-differential
privacy definition due to Dwork et al. (2006). First we apply the output perturbation ideas of
Dwork et al. (2006), to ERM classification. Then we propose a new method, objective perturba-
tion, for privacy-preserving machine learning algorithm design. This method entails perturbing
the objective function before optimizing over classifiers. If the loss and regularizer satisfy certain
convexity and differentiability criteria, we prove theoretical results showing that our algorithms
preserve privacy, and provide generalization bounds for linear and nonlinear kernels. We further
present a privacy-preserving technique for tuning the parameters in general machine learning
algorithms, thereby providing end-to-end privacy guarantees for the training process. We apply
these results to produce privacy-preserving analogues of regularized logistic regression and sup-
port vector machines. We obtain encouraging results from evaluating their performance on real
demographic and benchmark data sets. Our results show that both theoretically and empiri-
cally, objective perturbation is superior to the previous state-of-the-art, output perturbation, in
managing the inherent tradeoff between privacy and learning performance.
1 Introduction
Privacy has become a growing concern, due to the massive increase in personal information stored
in electronic databases, such as medical records, financial records, web search histories, and social
network data. Machine learning can be employed to discover novel population-wide patterns,
however the results of such algorithms may reveal certain individuals’ sensitive information, thereby
violating their privacy. Thus, an emerging challenge for machine learning is how to learn from
datasets that contain sensitive personal information.
At the first glance, it may appear that simple anonymization of private information is enough to
preserve privacy. However, this is often not the case; even if obvious identifiers, such as names and
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addresses, are removed from the data, the remaining fields can still form unique “signatures” that
can help re-identify individuals. Such attacks have been demonstrated by various works, and are
possible in many realistic settings, such as when an adversary has side information (Sweeney, 1997;
Narayanan and Shmatikov, 2008; Ganta et al., 2008), and when the data has structural proper-
ties (Backstrom et al., 2007), among others. Moreover, even releasing statistics on a sensitive
dataset may not be sufficient to preserve privacy, as illustrated on genetic data (Homer et al., 2008;
Wang et al., 2009). Thus, there is a great need for designing machine learning algorithms that also
preserve the privacy of individuals in the datasets on which they train and operate.
In this paper we focus on the problem of classification, one of the fundamental problems of
machine learning, when the training data consists of sensitive information of individuals. Our work
addresses the Empirical risk minimization (ERM) framework for classification, in which a classifier
is chosen by minimizing the average over the training data of the prediction loss (with respect
to the label) of the classifier in predicting each training data point. In this work, we focus on
regularized ERM in which there is an additional term in the optimization, called the regularizer,
which penalizes the complexity of the classifier with respect to some metric. Regularized ERM
methods are widely used in practice, for example in logistic regression and support vector machines
(SVMs), and many also have theoretical justification in the form of generalization error bounds
with respect to independently, identically distributed (i.i.d.) data (see Vapnik (1998) for further
details).
For our privacy measure, we use a definition due to Dwork et al. (2006b), who have proposed a
measure of quantifying the privacy-risk associated with computing functions of sensitive data. Their
ǫ-differential privacy model is a strong, cryptographically-motivated definition of privacy that has
recently received a significant amount of research attention for its robustness to known attacks, such
as those involving side information (Ganta et al., 2008). Algorithms satisfying ǫ-differential privacy
are randomized; the output is a random variable whose distribution is conditioned on the data set.
A statistical procedure satisfies ǫ-differential privacy if changing a single data point does not shift
the output distribution by too much. Therefore, from looking at the output of the algorithm, it is
difficult to infer the value of any particular data point.
In this paper, we develop methods for approximating ERM while guaranteeing ǫ-differential
privacy. Our results hold for loss functions and regularizers satisfying certain differentiability
and convexity conditions. An important aspect of our work is that we develop methods for end-
to-end privacy ; each step in the learning process can cause additional risk of privacy violation,
and we provide algorithms with quantifiable privacy guarantees for training as well as parameter
tuning. For training, we provide two privacy-preserving approximations to ERM. The first is output
perturbation, based on the sensitivity method proposed by Dwork et al. (2006b). In this method
noise is added to the output of the standard ERM algorithm. The second method is novel, and
involves adding noise to the regularized ERM objective function prior to minimizing. We call
this second method objective perturbation. We show theoretical bounds for both procedures; the
theoretical performance of objective perturbation is superior to that of output perturbation for
most problems. However, for our results to hold we require that the regularizer be strongly convex
(ruling L1 regularizers) and additional constraints on the loss function and its derivatives. In
practice, these additional constraints do not affect the performance of the resulting classifier; we
validate our theoretical results on data sets from the UCI repository.
In practice, parameters in learning algorithms are chosen via a holdout data set. In the context
of privacy, we must guarantee the privacy of the holdout data as well. We exploit results from
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the theory of differential privacy to develop a privacy-preserving parameter tuning algorithm, and
demonstrate its use in practice. Together with our training algorithms, this parameter tuning
algorithm guarantees privacy to all data used in the learning process.
Guaranteeing privacy incurs a cost in performance; because the algorithms must cause some
uncertainty in the output, they increase the loss of the output predictor. Because the ǫ-differential
privacy model requires robustness against all data sets, we make no assumptions on the underlying
data for the purposes of making privacy guarantees. However, to prove the impact of privacy
constraints on the generalization error, we assume the data is i.i.d. according to a fixed but unknown
distribution, as is standard in the machine learning literature. Although many of our results hold
for ERM in general, we provide specific results for classification using logistic regression and support
vector machines. Some of the former results were reported in Chaudhuri and Monteleoni (2008);
here we generalize them to ERM and extend the results to kernel methods, and provide experiments
on real datasets.
More specifically, the contributions of this paper are as follows:
• We derive a computationally efficient algorithm for ERM classification, based on the sensi-
tivity method due to Dwork et al. (2006b). We analyze the accuracy of this algorithm, and
provide an upper bound on the number of training samples required by this algorithm to
achieve a fixed generalization error.
• We provide a general technique, objective perturbation, for providing computationally efficient,
differentially private approximations to regularized ERM algorithms. This extends the work of
Chaudhuri and Monteleoni (2008), which follows as a special case, and corrects an error in the
arguments made there. We apply the general results on the sensitivity method and objective
perturbation to logistic regression and support vector machine classifiers. In addition to
privacy guarantees, we also provide generalization bounds for this algorithm.
• For kernel methods with nonlinear kernel functions, the optimal classifier is a linear combina-
tion of kernel functions centered at the training points. This form is inherently non-private
because it reveals the training data. We adapt a random projection method due to Rahimi
and Recht (Rahimi and Recht, 2007, 2008b), to develop privacy-preserving kernel-ERM al-
gorithms. We provide theoretical results on generalization performance.
• Because the holdout data is used in the process of training and releasing a classifier, we
provide a privacy-preserving parameter tuning algorithm based on a randomized selection
procedure (McSherry and Talwar, 2007) applicable to general machine learning algorithms.
This guarantees end-to-end privacy during the learning procedure.
• We validate our results using experiments on two datasets from the UCI Machine Learning
repositories (Asuncion and Newman, 2007)) and KDDCup (Hettich and Bay, 1999). Our
results show that objective perturbation is generally superior to output perturbation. We
also demonstrate the impact of end-to-end privacy on generalization error.
1.1 Related Work
There has been a significant amount of literature on the ineffectiveness of simple anonymization
procedures. For example, Narayanan and Shmatikov (2008) show that a small amount of auxiliary
information (knowledge of a few movie-ratings, and approximate dates) is sufficient for an adversary
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to re-identify an individual in the Netflix dataset, which consists of anonymized data about Netflix
users and their movie ratings. The same phenomenon has been observed in other kinds of data, such
as social network graphs (Backstrom et al., 2007), search query logs (Jones et al., 2007) and others.
Releasing statistics computed on sensitive data can also be problematic; for example, Wang et al.
(2009) show that releasing R2-values computed on high-dimensional genetic data can lead to privacy
breaches by an adversary who is armed with a small amount of auxiliary information.
There has also been a significant amount of work on privacy-preserving data mining (Agrawal and Srikant,
2000; Evfimievski et al., 2003; Sweeney, 2002; Machanavajjhala et al., 2006), spanning several com-
munities, that uses privacy models other than differential privacy. Many of the models used have
been shown to be susceptible to composition attacks, attacks in which the adversary has some
reasonable amount of prior knowledge (Ganta et al., 2008). Other work (Mangasarian et al., 2008)
considers the problem of privacy-preserving SVM classification when separate agents have to share
private data, and provides a solution that uses random kernels, but does provide any formal privacy
guarantee.
An alternative line of privacy work is in the Secure Multiparty Computation setting due to
Yao (1982), where the sensitive data is split across multiple hostile databases, and the goal is to
compute a function on the union of these databases. Zhan and Matwin (2007) and Laur et al.
(2006) consider computing privacy-preserving SVMs in this setting, and their goal is to design a
distributed protocol to learn a classifier. This is in contrast with our work, which deals with a
setting where the algorithm has access to the entire dataset.
Differential privacy, the formal privacy definition used in our paper, was proposed by the
seminal work of Dwork et al. (2006b), and has been used since in numerous works on privacy
(Chaudhuri and Mishra, 2006; McSherry and Talwar, 2007; Nissim et al., 2007; Barak et al., 2007;
Chaudhuri and Monteleoni, 2008; Machanavajjhala et al., 2008). Unlike many other privacy def-
initions, such as those mentioned above, differential privacy has been shown to be resistant to
composition attacks (attacks involving side-information) (Ganta et al., 2008). Some follow-up
work on differential privacy includes work on differentially-private combinatorial optimization, due
to Gupta et al. (2010), and differentially-private contingency tables, due to Barak et al. (2007)
and Kasivishwanathan et al. (2010). Wasserman and Zhou (2010) provide a more statistical view
of differential privacy, and Zhou et al. (2009) provide a technique of generating synthetic data using
compression via random linear or affine transformations.
Previous literature has also considered learning with differential privacy. One of the first such
works is Kasiviswanathan et al. (2008), which presents a general, although computationally inef-
ficient, method for PAC-learning finite concept classes. Blum et al. (2008) presents a method for
releasing a database in a differentially-private manner, so that certain fixed classes of queries can
be answered accurately, provided the class of queries has a bounded VC-dimension. Their methods
can also be used to learn classifiers with a fixed VC-dimension – see Kasiviswanathan et al. (2008);
however the resulting algorithm is also computationally inefficient. Some sample complexity lower
bounds in this setting have been provided by Beimel et al. (2010). In addition, Dwork and Lei
(2009) explore a connection between differential privacy and robust statistics, and provide an algo-
rithm for privacy-preserving regression using ideas from robust statistics. However, their algorithm
also requires a running time which is exponential in the data dimension, and is hence computation-
ally inefficient.
This work builds on our preliminary work in Chaudhuri and Monteleoni (2008). We first show
how to extend the sensitivity method, a form of output perturbation, due to Dwork et al. (2006b),
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to classification algorithms. In general, output perturbation methods alter the output of the func-
tion computed on the database, before releasing it; in particular the sensitivity method makes
an algorithm differentially private by adding noise to its output. In the classification setting, the
noise protects the privacy of the training data, but increases the prediction error of the classifier.
Recently, independent work by Rubinstein et al. (2009) has reported an extension of the sensitivity
method to linear and kernel SVMs. Their utility analysis differs from ours, and thus the analo-
gous generalization bounds are not comparable. Because Rubinstein et al. use techniques from
algorithmic stability, their utility bounds compare the private and non-private classifiers using the
same value for the regularization parameter. In contrast, our approach takes into account how
the value of the regularization parameter might change due to privacy constraints. In contrast, we
propose the objective perturbation method, in which noise is added to the objective function before
optimizing over the space classifiers. Both the sensitivity method and objective perturbation result
in computationally efficient algorithms for our specific case. In general, our theoretical bounds on
sample requirement are incomparable with the bounds of Kasiviswanathan et al. (2008) because of
the difference between their setting and ours.
Our approach to privacy-preserving tuning uses the exponential mechanism of McSherry and Talwar
(2007) by training classifiers with different parameters on disjoint subsets of the data and then ran-
domizing the selection of which classifier to release. This bears a superficial resemblance to the
sample-and-aggregate (Nissim et al., 2007) and V-fold cross-validation, but only in the sense that
only a part of the data is used to train the classifier. One drawback is that our approach requires sig-
nificantly more data in practice. Other approaches to selecting the regularization parameter could
benefit from a more careful analysis of the regularization parameter, as in Hastie et al. (2004).
2 Model
We will use ‖x‖, ‖x‖∞, and ‖x‖H to denote the ℓ2-norm, ℓ∞-norm, and norm in a Hilbert space H,
respectively. For an integer n we will use [n] to denote the set {1, 2, . . . , n}. Vectors will typically
be written in boldface and sets in calligraphic type. For a matrix A, we will use the notation ‖A‖2
to denote the L2 norm of A.
2.1 Empirical Risk Minimization
In this paper we develop privacy-preserving algorithms for regularized empirical risk minimization,
a special case of which is learning a classifier from labeled examples. We will phrase our problem in
terms of classification and indicate when more general results hold. Our algorithms take as input
training data D = {(xi,yi) ∈ X × Y : i = 1, 2, . . . , n} of n data-label pairs. In the case of binary
classification the data space X = Rd and the label set Y = {−1,+1}. We will assume throughout
that X is the unit ball so that ‖xi‖2 ≤ 1.
We would like to produce a predictor f : X → Y. We measure the quality of our predictor on
the training data via a nonnegative loss function ℓ : Y × Y → R.
In regularized empirical risk minimization (ERM), we choose a predictor f that minimizes the
regularized empirical loss:
J(f ,D) = 1
n
n∑
i=1
ℓ(f(xi),yi) + ΛN(f). (1)
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This minimization is performed over f in an hypothesis class H. The regularizer N(·) prevents
over-fitting. For the first part of this paper we will restrict our attention to linear predictors and
with some abuse of notation we will write f(x) = fTx.
2.2 Assumptions on loss and regularizer
The conditions under which we can prove results on privacy and generalization error depend on
analytic properties of the loss and regularizer. In particular, we will require certain forms of
convexity (see Rockafellar and Wets (1998)).
Definition 1. A function H(f) over f ∈ Rd is said to be strictly convex if for all α ∈ (0, 1), f , and
g,
H (αf + (1− α)g) < αH(f) + (1− α)H(g). (2)
It is said to be λ-strongly convex if for all α ∈ (0, 1), f , and g,
H (αf + (1− α)g) ≤ αH(f) + (1− α)H(g) − 1
2
λα(1− α) ‖f − g‖22 . (3)
A strictly convex function has a unique minimum – see Boyd and Vandenberghe (2004). Strong
convexity plays a role in guaranteeing our privacy and generalization requirements. For our privacy
results to hold we will also require that the regularizer N(·) and loss function ℓ(·, ·) be differentiable
functions of f . This excludes certain classes of regularizers, such as the ℓ1-norm regularizer N(f) =
‖f‖1, and classes of loss functions such as the hinge loss ℓSVM(fTx, y) = (1−yfTx)+. In some cases
we can prove privacy guarantees for approximations to these non-differentiable functions.
2.3 Privacy model
We are interested in producing a classifier in a manner that preserves the privacy of individual
entries of the dataset D that is used in training the classifier. The notion of privacy we use is
the ǫ-differential privacy model, developed by Dwork et al. (2006b); Dwork (2006), which defines a
notion of privacy for a randomized algorithm A(D). Suppose A(D) produces a classifier, and let
D′ be another dataset that differs from D in one entry (which we assume is the private value of
one person). That is, D′ and D have n − 1 points (xi, yi) in common. The algorithm A provides
differential privacy if for any set S, the likelihood thatA(D) ∈ S is close to the likelihood A(D′) ∈ S,
(where the likelihood is over the randomness in the algorithm). That is, any single entry of the
dataset does not affect the output distribution of the algorithm by much; dually, this means that
an adversary, who knows all but one entry of the dataset, cannot gain much additional information
about the last entry by observing the output of the algorithm.
The following definition of differential privacy is due to Dwork et al. (2006b), paraphrased
from Wasserman and Zhou (2010).
Definition 2. An algorithm A(B) taking values in a set T provides ǫp-differential privacy if
sup
S
sup
D,D′
µ (S | B = D)
µ (S | B = D′) ≤ e
ǫp , (4)
where the first supremum is over all measurable S ⊆ T , the second is over all datasets D and D′
differing in a single entry, and µ(·|B) is the conditional distribution (measure) on T induced by
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Figure 1: An algorithm which is differentially private. When datasets which are identical except
for a single entry are input to the algorithm A, the two distributions on the algorithm’s output are
close. For a fixed measurable S the ratio of the measures (or densities) should be bounded.
the output A(B) given a dataset B. The ratio is interpreted to be 1 whenever the numerator and
denominator are both 0.
Note that if S is a set of measure 0 under the conditional measures induced by D and D′, the
ratio is automatically 1. A more measure-theoretic definition is given in Zhou et al. (2009). An
illustration of the definition is given in Figure 1.
The following form of the definition is due to Dwork et al. (2006a).
Definition 3. An algorithm A provides ǫp-differential privacy if for any two datasets D and D′
that differ in a single entry and for any set S,
exp(−ǫp)P(A(D′) ∈ S) ≤ P(A(D) ∈ S) ≤ exp(ǫp)P(A(D′) ∈ S), (5)
where A(D) (resp. A(D′)) is the output of A on input D (resp. D′).
We observe that an algorithm A that satisfies Equation 4 also satisfies Equation 5, and as a
result, Definition 2 is stronger than Definition 3.
From this definition, it is clear that the A(D) that outputs the minimizer of the ERM objective
(1) does not provide ǫp-differential privacy for any ǫp. This is because an ERM solution is a linear
combination of some selected training samples “near” the decision boundary. If D and D′ differ in
one of these samples, then the classifier will change completely, making the likelihood ratio in (5)
infinite. Regularization helps by penalizing the L2 norm of the change, but does not account how
the direction of the minimizer is sensitive to changes in the data.
Dwork et al. (2006b) also provide a standard recipe for computing privacy-preserving approxi-
mations to functions by adding noise with a particular distribution to the output of the function.
We call this recipe the sensitivity method. Let g : (Rm)n → R be a scalar function of z1, . . . , zn,
where zi ∈ Rm corresponds to the private value of individual i; then the sensitivity of g is defined
as follows.
Definition 4. The sensitivity of a function g : (Rm)n → R is maximum difference between the
values of the function when one input changes. More formally, the sensitivity S(g) of g is defined
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as:
S(g) = max
i
max
z1,...,zn,z′i
∣∣g(z1, . . . , zi−1, zi, zi+1, . . . , zn)− g(z1, . . . , zi−1, z′i, zi+1, . . . , zn)∣∣ . (6)
To compute a function g on a dataset D = {z1, . . . , zn}, the sensitivity method outputs
g(z1, . . . , zn) + η, where η is a random variable drawn according to the Laplace distribution, with
mean 0 and standard deviation S(g)ǫp . It is shown in Dwork et al. (2006b) that such a procedure is
ǫp-differentially private.
3 Privacy-preserving ERM
Here we describe two approaches for creating privacy-preserving algorithms from (1).
3.1 Output perturbation : the sensitivity method
Algorithm 1 is derived from the sensitivity method of Dwork et al. (2006b), a general method for
generating a privacy-preserving approximation to any function A(·). In this section the norm ‖ · ‖
is the L2-norm unless otherwise specified. For the function A(D) = argmin J(f ,D), Algorithm 1
outputs a vector A(D) + b, where b is random noise with density
ν(b) =
1
α
e−β‖b‖ , (7)
where α is a normalizing constant. The parameter β is a function of ǫp, and the L2-sensitivity of
A(·), which is defined as follows.
Definition 5. The L2-sensitivity of a vector-valued function is defined as the maximum change in
the L2 norm of the value of the function when one input changes. More formally,
S(A) = max
i
max
z1,...,zn,z′i
∥∥A(z1, . . . , zi, . . .)−A(z1, . . . , z′i, . . .)∥∥ . (8)
The interested reader is referred to Dwork et al. (2006b) for further details. Adding noise to
the output of A(·) has the effect of masking the effect of any particular data point. However, in
some applications the sensitivity of the minimizer argmin J(f ,D) may be quite high, which would
require the sensitivity method to add noise with high variance.
Algorithm 1 ERM with output perturbation (sensitivity)
Inputs: Data D = {zi}, parameters ǫp, Λ.
Output: Approximate minimizer fpriv.
Draw a vector b according to (7) with β =
nΛǫp
2 .
Compute fpriv = argmin J(f ,D) + b.
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3.2 Objective perturbation
A different approach, first proposed by Chaudhuri and Monteleoni (2008), is to add noise to the
objective function itself and then produce the minimizer of the perturbed objective. That is, we
can minimize
Jpriv(f ,D) = J(f ,D) + 1
n
bT f , (9)
where b has density given by (7), with β = ǫp. Note that the privacy parameter here does not
depend on the sensitivity of the of the classification algorithm.
Algorithm 2 ERM with objective perturbation
Inputs: Data D = {zi}, parameters ǫp, Λ, c.
Output: Approximate minimizer fpriv.
Let ǫ′p = ǫp − log(1 + 2cnΛ + c
2
n2Λ2 ).
If ǫ′p > 0, then ∆ = 0, else ∆ =
c
n(eǫp/4−1)
− Λ, and ǫ′p = ǫp/2.
Draw a vector b according to (7) with β = ǫ′p/2.
Compute fpriv = argmin Jpriv(f ,D) + 12∆||f ||2.
The algorithm requires a certain slack, log(1+ 2cnΛ+
c2
n2Λ2
), in the privacy parameter. This is due
to additional factors in bounding the ratio of the densities. The “If” statement in the algorithm
is from having to consider two cases in the proof of Theorem 2, which shows that the algorithm is
differentially private.
3.3 Privacy guarantees
In this section, we establish the conditions under which Algorithms 1 and 2 provide ǫp-differential
privacy. First, we establish guarantees for Algorithm 1.
3.3.1 Privacy Guarantees for Output Perturbation
Theorem 1. If N(·) is differentiable, and 1-strongly convex, and ℓ is convex and differentiable,
with |ℓ′(z)| ≤ 1 for all z, then, Algorithm 1 provides ǫp-differential privacy.
The proof of Theorem 1 follows from Corollary 1, and Dwork et al. (2006b). The proof is
provided here for completeness.
Proof. From Corollary 1, if the conditions on N(·) and ℓ hold, then the L2-sensivity of ERM with
regularization parameter Λ is at most 2nΛ . We observe that when we pick ||b|| from the distribution
in Algorithm 1, for a specific vector b0 ∈ Rd, the density at b0 is proportional to e−
nΛǫp
2
||b0||. Let
D and D′ be any two datasets that differ in the value of one individual. Then, for any f ,
g(f |D)
g(f |D′) =
ν(b1)
ν(b2)
= e−
nΛǫp
2
(||b1||−||b2||), (10)
where b1 and b2 are the corresponding noise vectors chosen in Step 1 of Algorithm 1, and g(f |D)
(g(f |D′) respectively) is the density of the output of Algorithm 1 at f , when the input is D (D′
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respectively). If f1 and f2 are the solutions respectively to non-private regularized ERM when the
input is D and D′, then, b2 − b1 = f2 − f1. From Corollary 1, and using a triangle inequality,
||b1|| − ||b2|| ≤ ||b1 − b2|| = ||f2 − f1|| ≤ 2
nΛ
. (11)
Moreover, by symmetry, the density of the directions of b1 and b2 are uniform. Therefore, by
construction, ν(b1)ν(b2) ≤ eǫp . The theorem follows.
The main ingredient of the proof of Theorem 1 is a result about the sensitivity of regularized
ERM, which is provided below.
Lemma 1. Let G(f) and g(f) be two vector-valued functions, which are continuous, and differen-
tiable at all points. Moreover, let G(f) and G(f) + g(f) be λ-strongly convex. If f1 = argminf G(f)
and f2 = argminf G(f) + g(f), then
‖f1 − f2‖ ≤ 1
λ
max
f
‖∇g(f)‖ . (12)
Proof. Using the definition of f1 and f2, and the fact that G and g are continuous and differentiable
everywhere,
∇G(f1) = ∇G(f2) +∇g(f2) = 0. (13)
As G(f) is λ-strongly convex, it follows from Lemma 14 of Shalev-Shwartz (2007) that:
(∇G(f1)−∇G(f2))T (f1 − f2) ≥ λ ‖f1 − f2‖2 . (14)
Combining this with (13) and the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality, we get that
‖f1 − f2‖ · ‖∇g(f2)‖ ≥ (f1 − f2)T∇g(f2) = (∇G(f1)−∇G(f2))T (f1 − f2) ≥ λ ‖f1 − f2‖2 . (15)
The conclusion follows from dividing both sides by λ ‖f1 − f2‖.
Corollary 1. If N(·) is differentiable and 1-strongly convex, and ℓ is convex and differentiable with
|ℓ′(z)| ≤ 1 for all z, then, the L2-sensitivity of J(f ,D) is at most 2nΛ .
Proof. Let D = {(x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn)} and D′ = {(x1, y1), . . . , (x′n, y′n)} be two datasets that differ
in the value of the n-th individual. Moreover, we let G(f) = J(f ,D), g(f) = J(f ,D′) − J(f ,D),
f1 = argminf J(f ,D), and f2 = argminf J(f ,D′). Finally, we set g(f) = 1n(ℓ(y′nfTx′n)− ℓ(ynfTxn)).
We observe that due to the convexity of ℓ, and 1-strong convexity of N(·), G(f) = J(f ,D) is
Λ-strongly convex. Moreover, G(f) + g(f) = J(f ,D′) is also Λ-strongly convex. Finally, due to the
differentiability of N(·) and ℓ, G(f) and g(f) are also differentiable at all points. We have:
∇g(f) = 1
n
(ynℓ
′(ynf
Txn)xn − y′nℓ′(y′nfTx′n)x′n). (16)
As yi ∈ [−1, 1], |ℓ′(z)| ≤ 1, for all z, and ||xi|| ≤ 1, for any f , ||∇g(f)|| ≤ 1n(||xn − x′n||) ≤
1
n(||xn||+ ||x′n||) ≤ 2n . The proof now follows by an application of Lemma 1.
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3.3.2 Privacy Guarantees for Objective Perturbation
In this section, we show that Algorithm 2 is ǫp-differentially private. This proof requires stronger
assumptions on the loss function than were required in Theorem 1. In certain cases, some of these
assumptions can be weakened; for such an example, see Section 3.4.2.
Theorem 2. If N(·) is 1-strongly convex and doubly differentiable, and ℓ(·) is convex and doubly
differentiable, with |ℓ′(z)| ≤ 1 and |ℓ′′(z)| ≤ c for all z, then Algorithm 2 is ǫp-differentially private.
Proof. Consider an fpriv output by Algorithm 2. We observe that given any fixed fpriv and a fixed
dataset D, there always exists a b such that Algorithm 2 outputs fpriv on input D. Because ℓ
is differentiable and convex, and N(·) is differentiable, we can take the gradient of the objective
function and set it to 0 at fpriv. Therefore,
b = −nΛ∇N(fpriv)−
n∑
i=1
yiℓ
′(yif
T
privxi)xi − n∆fpriv. (17)
Note that (17) holds because for any f , ∇ℓ(fTx) = ℓ′(fTx)x.
We claim that as ℓ is differentiable and J(f ,D) + ∆2 ||f ||2 is strongly convex, given a dataset
D = (x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn), there is a bijection between b and fpriv. The relation (17) shows that
two different b values cannot result in the same fpriv. Furthermore, since the objective is strictly
convex, for a fixed b and D, there is a unique fpriv; therefore the map from b to fpriv is injective.
The relation (17) also shows that for any fpriv there exists a b for which fpriv is the minimizer, so
the map from b to fpriv is surjective.
To show ǫp-differential privacy, we need to compute the ratio g(fpriv|D)/g(fpriv|D′) of the den-
sities of fpriv under the two datasets D and D′. This ratio can be written as (Billingsley, 1995)
g(fpriv|D)
g(fpriv|D′) =
µ(b|D)
µ(b′|D′) ·
|det(J(fpriv → b|D))|−1
|det(J(fpriv → b′|D′))|−1 ,
where J(fpriv → b|D), J(fpriv → b|D′) are the Jacobian matrices of the mappings from fpriv to b,
and µ(b|D) and µ(b|D′) are the densities of b given the output fpriv, when the datasets are D and
D′ respectively.
First, we bound the ratio of the Jacobian determinants. Let b(j) denote the j-th coordinate of
b. From (17) we have
b(j) = −nΛ∇N(fpriv)(j) −
n∑
i=1
ℓ′(yif
T
privxi)x
(j)
i − n∆f (j)priv.
Given a dataset D, the (j, k)-th entry of the Jacobian matrix J(f → b|D) is
∂b(j)
∂f
(k)
priv
= −nΛ∇2N(fpriv)(j,k) −
∑
i
y2i ℓ
′′(yif
T
privxi)x
(j)
i x
(k)
i − n∆1(j = k),
where 1(·) is the indicator function. We note that the Jacobian is defined for all fpriv because N(·)
and ℓ are globally doubly differentiable.
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Let D and D′ be two datasets which differ in the value of the n-th item such that
D = {(x1, y1), . . . , (xn−1, yn−1), (xn, yn)} and D′ = {(x1, y1), . . . , (xn−1, yn−1), (x′n, y′n)}. Moreover,
we define matrices A and E as follows:
A = nΛ∇2N(fpriv) +
n∑
i=1
y2i ℓ
′′(yif
T
privxi)xix
T
i + n∆Id
E = −y2nℓ′′(ynfTprivxn)xnxTn + (y′n)2ℓ′′(y′nfTprivx′n)x′nx′Tn .
Then, J(fpriv → b|D) = −A, and J(fpriv → b|D′) = −(A+E).
Let λ1(M) and λ2(M) denote the largest and second largest eigenvalues of a matrix M . As E
has rank at most 2, from Lemma 2,
|det(J(fpriv → b|D′))|
|det(J(fpriv → b|D))| =
|det(A+ E)|
|detA|
= |1 + λ1(A−1E) + λ2(A−1E) + λ1(A−1E)λ2(A−1E)|.
For a 1-strongly convex functionN , the Hessian∇2N(fpriv) has eigenvalues greater than 1 (Boyd and Vandenberghe,
2004). Since we have assumed ℓ is doubly differentiable and convex, any eigenvalue of A is therefore
at least nΛ + n∆; therefore, for j = 1, 2, |λj(A−1E)| ≤ |λj(E)|n(Λ+∆) . Applying the triangle inequality
to the trace norm:
|λ1(E)| + |λ2(E)| ≤ |y2nℓ′′(ynfTprivxn)| · ‖xn‖+ | − (y′n)2ℓ′′(y′nfTprivx′n)| ·
∥∥x′n∥∥ .
Then upper bounds on |yi|, ||xi||, and |ℓ′′(z)| yield
|λ1(E)|+ |λ2(E)| ≤ 2c.
Therefore, |λ1(E)| · |λ2(E)| ≤ c2, and
|det(A+ E)|
|det(A)| ≤ 1 +
2c
n(Λ + ∆)
+
c2
n2(Λ + ∆)2
=
(
1 +
c
n(Λ + ∆)
)2
.
We now consider two cases. In the first case, ∆ = 0, and by definition, in that case, 1+ 2cnΛ+
c2
n2Λ2
≤
eǫp−ǫ
′
p . In the second case, ∆ > 0, and in this case, by definition of ∆, (1+ cn(Λ+∆))
2 = eǫp/2 = eǫp−ǫ
′
p .
Next, we bound the ratio of the densities of b. We observe that as |ℓ′(z)| ≤ 1, for any z and
|yi|, ||xi|| ≤ 1, for datasets D and D′ which differ by one value,
b′ − b = ynℓ′(ynfTprivxn)xn − y′nℓ′(ynfTprivx′n)x′n.
This implies that:
‖b‖ − ∥∥b′∥∥ ≤ ∥∥b− b′∥∥ ≤ 2.
We can write:
µ(b|D)
µ(b′|D′) =
||b||d−1e−ǫ′p||b||/2 · 1surf(||b||)
||b′||d−1e−ǫ′p||b′||/2 · 1surf(||b′||)
≤ eǫ′p(||b||−||b′||)/2 ≤ eǫ′p ,
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where surf(x) denotes the surface area of the sphere in d dimensions with radius x. Here the last
step follows from the fact that surf(x) = s(1)xd−1, where s(1) is the surface area of the unit sphere
in Rd.
Finally, we are ready to bound the ratio of densities:
g(fpriv|D)
g(fpriv|D′) =
µ(b|D)
µ(b′|D′) ·
|det(J(fpriv → b|D′))|
|det(J(fpriv → b′|D))|
=
µ(b|D)
µ(b′|D′) ·
|det(A+ E)|
|detA|
≤ eǫ′p · eǫp−ǫ′p
≤ eǫp .
Thus, Algorithm 2 satisfies Definition 2.
Lemma 2. If A is full rank, and if E has rank at most 2, then,
det(A+ E)− det(A)
det(A)
= λ1(A
−1E) + λ2(A
−1E) + λ1(A
−1E)λ2(A
−1E), (18)
where λj(Z) is the j-th eigenvalue of matrix Z.
Proof. Note that E has rank at most 2, so A−1E also has rank at most 2. Using the fact that
λi(I +A
−1E) = 1 + λi(A
−1E),
det(A+ E)− det(A)
detA
= det(I +A−1E)− 1
= (1 + λ1(A
−1E))(1 + λ2(A
−1E))− 1
= λ1(A
−1E) + λ2(A
−1E) + λ1(A
−1E)λ2(A
−1E).
3.4 Application to classification
In this section, we show how to use our results to provide privacy-preserving versions of logistic
regression and support vector machines.
3.4.1 Logistic Regression
One popular ERM classification algorithm is regularized logistic regression. In this case, N(f) =
1
2 ||f ||2, and the loss function is ℓLR(z) = log(1 + e−z). Taking derivatives and double derivatives,
ℓ′LR(z) =
−1
(1 + ez)
ℓ′′LR(z) =
1
(1 + e−z)(1 + ez)
.
Note that ℓLR is continuous, differentiable and doubly differentiable, with c ≤ 14 . Therefore, we can
plug in logistic loss directly to Theorems 1 and 2 to get the following result.
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Corollary 2. The output of Algorithm 1 with N(f) = 12 ||f ||2, ℓ = ℓLR is an ǫp-differentially private
approximation to logistic regression. The output of Algorithm 2 with N(f) = 12 ||f ||2, c = 14 , and
ℓ = ℓLR, is an ǫp-differentially private approximation to logistic regression.
We quantify how well the outputs of Algorithms 1 and 2 approximate (non-private) logistic
regression in Section 4.
3.4.2 Support Vector Machines
Another very commonly used classifier is L2-regularized support vector machines. In this case,
again, N(f) = 12 ||f ||2, and
ℓSVM(z) = max(0, 1 − z). (19)
Notice that this loss function is continuous, but not differentiable, and thus it does not satisfy
conditions in Theorems 1 and 2.
There are two alternative solutions to this. First, we can approximate ℓSVM by a different loss
function, which is doubly differentiable, as follows (see also Chapelle (2007)):
ℓs(z) =


0 if z > 1 + h
− (1−z)4
16h3
+ 3(1−z)
2
8h +
1−z
2 +
3h
16 if |1− z| ≤ h
1− z if z < 1− h
(20)
As h→ 0, this loss approaches the hinge loss. Taking derivatives, we observe that:
ℓ′s(z) =


0 if z > 1 + h
(1−z)3
4h3
− 3(1−z)4h − 12 if |1− z| ≤ h
−1 if z < 1− h
(21)
Moreover,
ℓ′′s(z) =


0 if z > 1 + h
−3(1−z)24h3 + 34h if |1− z| ≤ h
0 if z < 1− h
(22)
Observe that this implies that |ℓ′′s(z)| ≤ 34h for all h and z. Moreover, ℓs is convex, as ℓ′′s(z) ≥ 0
for all z. Therefore, ℓs can be used in Theorems 1 and 2, which gives us privacy-preserving
approximations to regularized support vector machines.
Corollary 3. The output of Algorithm 1 with N(f) = 12 ||f ||2, and ℓ = ℓs is an ǫp-differentially
private approximation to support vector machines. The output of Algorithm 2 with N(f) = 12 ||f ||2,
c = 34h , and ℓ = ℓs is an ǫp-differentially private approximation to support vector machines.
The second solution is to use Huber Loss, as suggested by Chapelle (2007), which is defined as
follows:
ℓHuber(z) =


0 if z > 1 + h
1
4h(1 + h− z)2 if |1− z| ≤ h
1− z if z < 1− h
(23)
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Observe that Huber loss is convex and differentiable, and piecewise doubly-differentiable, with
c = 12h . However, it is not globally doubly differentiable, and hence the Jacobian in the proof of
Theorem 2 is undefined for certain values of f . However, we can show that in this case, Algorithm
2, when run with c = 12h satisfies Definition 3.
Let G denote the map from fpriv to b in (17) under B = D, and H denote the map under
B = D′. By definition, the probability P(fpriv ∈ S | B = D) = Pb(b ∈ G(S)).
Corollary 4. Let fpriv be the output of Algorithm 2 with ℓ = ℓHuber, c =
1
2h , and N(f) =
1
2 ||f ||22.
For any set S of possible values of fpriv, and any pair of datasets D, D′ which differ in the private
value of one person (xn, yn),
e−ǫpP(S | B = D′) ≤ P(S | B = D) ≤ eǫpP(S | B = D′). (24)
Proof. Consider the event fpriv ∈ S. Let T = G(S) and T ′ = H(S). Because G is a bijection, we
have
P(fpriv ∈ S | B = D) = Pb(b ∈ T | B = D), (25)
and a similar expression when B = D′.
Now note that ℓ′Huber(z) is only non-differentiable for a finite number of values of z. Let Z be
the set of these values of z.
C = {f : yfTx = z ∈ Z, (x, y) ∈ D ∪ D′}. (26)
Pick a tuple (z, (x, y)) ∈ Z × (D ∪ D′). The set of f such that yfTx = z is a hyperplane in Rd.
Since ∇N(f) = f/2 and ℓ′ is piecewise linear, from (17) we see that the set of corresponding b’s
is also piecewise linear, and hence has Lebesgue measure 0. Since the measure corresponding to b
is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure, this hyperplane has probability 0
under b as well. Since C is a finite union of such hyperplanes, we have P(b ∈ G(C)) = 0.
Thus we have Pb(T | B = D) = Pb(G(S \C) | B = D), and similarly for D′. From the definition
of G and H, for f ∈ S \ C,
H(f) = G(f) + ynℓ
′(ynf
Txn)xn − y′nℓ′(y′nfTx′n)x′n. (27)
since f /∈ C, this mapping shows that if Pb(G(S \ C) | B = D) = 0 then we must have Pb(H(S \
C) | B = D) = 0. Thus the result holds for sets of measure 0. If S \ C has positive measure we
can calculate the ratio of the probabilities for fpriv for which the loss is twice-differentiable. For
such fpriv the Jacobian is also defined, and we can use a method similar to Theorem 2 to prove the
result.
Remark: Because the privacy proof for Algorithm 1 does not require the analytic properties
of 2, we can also use Huber loss in Algorithm 1 to get an ǫg-differentially private approximation to
the SVM. We quantify how well the outputs of Algorithms 1 and 2 approximate private support
vector machines in Section 4. These approximations to the hinge loss are necessary because of
the analytic requirements of Theorems 1 and 2 on the loss function. Because the requirements of
Theorem 2 are stricter, it may be possible to use an approximate loss in Algorithm 1 that would
not be admissible in Algorithm 2.
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4 Generalization performance
In this section, we provide guarantees on the performance of privacy-preserving ERM algorithms
in Section 3. We provide these bounds for L2-regularization. To quantify this performance, we
will assume that the n entries in the dataset D are drawn i.i.d. according to a fixed distribution
P (x, y). We measure the performance of these algorithms by the number of samples n required to
acheive error L∗ + ǫg, where L
∗ is the loss of a reference ERM predictor f0. This resulting bound
on ǫg will depend on the norm ‖f0‖ of this predictor. By choosing an upper bound ν on the norm,
we can interpret the result as saying that the privacy-preserving classifier will have error ǫg more
than that of any predictor with ‖f0‖ ≤ ν.
Given a distribution P the expected loss L(f) for a classifier f is
L(f) = E(x,y)∼P
[
ℓ(fTx, y)
]
. (28)
The sample complexity for generalization error ǫg against a classifier f0 is number of samples n
required to achieve error L(f0) + ǫg under any data distribution P . We would like the sample
complexity to be low.
For a fixed P we define the following function, which will be useful in our analysis:
J¯(f) = L(f) +
Λ
2
‖f‖2 . (29)
The function J¯(f) is the expectation (over P ) of the non-private L2-regularized ERM objective
evaluated at f .
For non-private ERM, Shalev-Shwartz and Srebro (2008) show that for a given f0 with loss
L(f0) = L
∗, if the number of data points
n > C
||f0||2 log(1δ )
ǫ2g
(30)
for some constant C, then the excess loss of the L2-regularized SVM solution fsvm satisfies L(fsvm) ≤
L(f0) + ǫg. This order growth will hold for our results as well. It also serves as a reference against
which we can compare the additional burden on the sample complexity imposed by the privacy
constraints.
For most learning problems, we require the generalization error ǫg < 1. Moreover, it is also typ-
ically the case that for more difficult learning problems, ||f0|| is higher. For example, for regularized
SVM, 1||f0|| is the margin of classification, and as a result, ||f0|| is higher for learning problems with
smaller margin. From the bounds provided in this section, we note that the dominating term in
the sample requirement for objective perturbation has a better dependence on ||f0|| as well as 1ǫg ;
as a result, for more difficult learning problems, we expect objective perturbation to perform better
than output perturbation.
4.1 Output perturbation
First, we provide performance guarantees for Algorithm 1, by providing a bound on the number of
samples required for Algorithm 1 to produce a classifier with low error.
Definition 6. A function g(z) : R→ R is c-Lipschitz if for all pairs (z1, z2) we have |g(z1)−g(z2)| ≤
c|z1 − z2|.
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Recall that if a function g(z) is differentiable, with |g′(z)| ≤ r for all z, then g(z) is also
r-Lipschitz.
Theorem 3. Let N(f) = 12 ||f ||2, and let f0 be a classifier such that L(f0) = L∗, and let δ > 0. If ℓ
is differentiable and continuous with |ℓ′(z)| ≤ 1, the derivative ℓ′ is c-Lipschitz, the data D is drawn
i.i.d. according to P , then there exists a constant C such that if the number of training samples
satisfies
n > Cmax
(
||f0||2 log(1δ )
ǫ2g
,
d log(dδ )||f0||
ǫgǫp
,
d log(dδ )c
1/2||f0||2
ǫ
3/2
g ǫp
)
, (31)
where d is the dimension of the data space, then the output fpriv of Algorithm 1 satisfies
P (L(fpriv) ≤ L∗ + ǫg) ≥ 1− 2δ. (32)
Proof. Let
frtr = argmin
f
J¯(f)
f∗ = argmin
f
J(f ,D),
and fpriv denote the output of Algorithm 1. Using the analysis method of Shalev-Shwartz and Srebro
(2008) shows
L(fpriv) = L(f0) + (J¯(fpriv)− J¯(frtr)) + (J¯(frtr)− J¯(f0)) + Λ
2
||f0||2 − Λ
2
||fpriv||2. (33)
We will bound the terms on the right-hand side of (33).
For a regularizer N(f) = 12 ||f ||2 the Hessian satisfies ||∇2N(f)||2 ≤ 1 . Therefore, from Lemma
3, with probability 1− δ over the privacy mechanism,
J(fpriv,D)− J(f∗,D) ≤ 8d
2 log2(d/δ)(c + Λ)
Λ2n2ǫ2p
.
Furthermore, the results of Sridharan et al. (2008) show that with probability 1− δ over the choice
of the data distribution,
J¯(fpriv)− J¯(frtr) ≤ 2(J(fpriv,D)− J(f∗,D)) +O
(
log(1/δ)
Λn
)
.
The constant in the last term depends on the derivative of the loss and the bound on the data points,
which by assumption are bounded. Combining the preceeding two statements, with probability
1 − 2δ over the noise in the privacy mechanism and the data distribution, the second term in the
right-hand-side of (33) is at most:
J¯(fpriv)− J¯(frtr) ≤ 16d
2 log2(d/δ)(c + Λ)
Λ2n2ǫ2p
+O
(
log(1/δ)
Λn
)
. (34)
By definition of frtr, the difference (J¯(frtr)− J¯(f0)) ≤ 0. Setting Λ = ǫg||f0||2 in (33) and using (34),
we obtain
L(fpriv) ≤ L(f0) + 16||f0||
4d2 log2(d/δ)(c + ǫg/||f0||2)
n2ǫ2gǫ
2
p
+O
(
||f0||2 log(1/δ)
nǫg
)
+
ǫg
2
. (35)
Solving for n to make the total excess error equal to ǫg yields (31).
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Lemma 3. Suppose N(·) is doubly differentiable with ||∇2N(f)||2 ≤ η for all f , and suppose that
ℓ is differentiable and has continuous and c-Lipschitz derivatives. Given training data D, let f∗ be
a classifier that minimizes J(f ,D) and let fpriv be the classifier output by Algorithm 1. Then
Pb
(
J(fpriv,D) ≤ J(f∗,D) + 2d
2(c+ Λη) log2(d/δ)
Λ2n2ǫ2p
)
≥ 1− δ, (36)
where the probability is taken over the randomness in the noise b of Algorithm 1.
Note that when ℓ is doubly differentiable, c is an upper bound on the double derivative of ℓ,
and is the same as the constant c in Theorem 2.
Proof. Let D = {(x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn)}, and recall that ||xi|| ≤ 1, and |yi| ≤ 1. As N(·) and ℓ are
differentiable, we use the Mean Value Theorem to show that for some t between 0 and 1,
J(fpriv,D)− J(f∗,D) = (fpriv − f∗)T∇J(tf∗ + (1− t)fpriv)
≤ ||fpriv − f∗|| · ||∇J(tf∗ + (1− t)fpriv)||, (37)
where the second step follows by an application of the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality. Recall that
∇J(f ,D) = Λ∇N(f) + 1
n
∑
i
yiℓ
′(yif
Txi)xi.
Moreover, recall that ∇J(f∗,D) = 0, from the optimality of f∗. Therefore,
∇J(tf∗ + (1− t)fpriv,D) = ∇J(f∗,D)− Λ(∇N(f∗)−∇N(tf∗ + (1− t)fpriv))
− 1
n
∑
i
yi
(
ℓ′(yi(f
∗)Txi)− ℓ′(yi(tf∗ + (1− t)fpriv)Txi)
)
xi. (38)
Now, from the Lipschitz condition on ℓ, for each i we can upper bound each term in the summation
above:
∥∥yi (ℓ′(yi(f∗)Txi)− ℓ′(yi(tf∗ + (1− t)fpriv)Txi))xi∥∥
≤ |yi| · ||xi|| · |ℓ′(yi(f∗)Txi)− ℓ′(yi(tf∗ + (1− t)fpriv)Txi)|
≤ |yi| · ||xi|| · c · |yi(1− t)(f∗ − fpriv)Txi|
≤ c(1 − t)|yi|2 · ||xi||2 · ||f∗ − fpriv||
≤ c(1 − t)||f∗ − fpriv||. (39)
The third step follows because ℓ′ is c-Lipschitz and the last step follows from the bounds on |yi|
and ||xi||. Because N is doubly differentiable, we can apply the Mean Value Theorem again to
conclude that
||∇N(tf∗ + (1− t)fpriv)−∇N(f∗)|| ≤ (1− t)||fpriv − f∗|| · ||∇2N(f ′′)||2 (40)
for some f ′′ ∈ Rd.
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As 0 ≤ t ≤ 1, we can combine (38), (39), and (40) to obtain
‖∇J(tf∗ + (1− t)fpriv,D)‖ ≤ ‖Λ(∇N(f∗)−∇N(tf∗ + (1− t)fpriv))‖
+
∥∥∥∥∥ 1n
∑
i
yi(ℓ
′(yi(f
∗)Txi)− ℓ′(yi(tf∗ + (1− t)fpriv)Txi))xi
∥∥∥∥∥
≤ (1− t) ‖fpriv − f∗‖ ·
(
Λη +
1
n
· n · c
)
≤ ‖fpriv − f∗‖ (Λη + c). (41)
From the definition of Algorithm 1, fpriv−f∗ = b, where b is the noise vector. Now we can apply
Lemma 4 to ||fpriv − f∗||, with parameters k = d, and θ = 2Λnǫp . From Lemma 4, with probability
1− δ, ||fpriv − f∗|| ≤ 2d log(
d
δ
)
Λnǫp
. The Lemma follows by combining this with Equations 41 and 37.
Lemma 4. Let X be a random variable drawn from the distribution Γ(k, θ), where k is an integer.
Then,
P
(
X < kθ log
(
k
δ
))
≥ 1− δ. (42)
Proof. Since k is an integer, we can decompose X distributed according to Γ(k, θ) as a summation
X = X1 + . . .+Xk, (43)
where X1,X2, . . . ,Xk are independent exponential random variables with mean θ. For each i we
have P(Xi ≥ θ log(k/δ)) = δ/k. Now,
P(X < kθ log(k/δ)) ≥ P(Xi < θ log(k/δ) i = 1, 2, . . . , k) (44)
= (1− δ/k)k (45)
≥ 1− δ. (46)
4.2 Objective perturbation
We now establish performance bounds on Algorithm 2. The bound can be summarized as follows.
Theorem 4. Let N(f) = 12 ||f ||2, and let f0 be a classifier with expected loss L(f0) = L∗. Let ℓ
be convex, doubly differentiable, and let its derivatives satisfy |ℓ′(z)| ≤ 1 and |ℓ′′(z)| ≤ c for all z.
Then there exists a constant C such that for δ > 0, if the n training samples in D are drawn i.i.d.
according to P , and if
n > Cmax
(
||f0||2 log(1/δ)
ǫ2g
,
c||f0||2
ǫgǫp
,
d log(dδ )||f0||
ǫgǫp
)
, (47)
then the output fpriv of Algorithm 2 satisfies
P (L(fpriv) ≤ L∗ + ǫg) ≥ 1− 2δ. (48)
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Proof. Let
frtr = argmin
f
J¯(f)
f∗ = argmin
f
J(f ,D),
and fpriv denote the output of Algorithm 1. As in Theorem 3, the analysis of Shalev-Shwartz and Srebro
(2008) shows
L(fpriv) = L(f0) + (J¯(fpriv)− J¯(frtr)) + (J¯(frtr)− J¯(f0)) + Λ
2
||f0||2 − Λ
2
||fpriv||2. (49)
We will bound each of the terms on the right-hand-side.
If n > c||f0||
2
ǫgǫp
and Λ >
ǫg
4||f0||2
, then nΛ > c4ǫp , so from the definition of ǫ
′
p in Algorithm 2,
ǫ′p = ǫp − 2 log
(
1 +
c
nΛ
)
= ǫp − 2 log
(
1 +
ǫp
4
)
≥ ǫp − ǫp
2
, (50)
where the last step follows because log(1 + x) ≤ x for x ∈ [0, 1]. Note that for these values of Λ we
have ǫ′p > 0.
Therefore, we can apply Lemma 5 to conclude that with probability at least 1 − δ over the
privacy mechanism,
J(fpriv,D)− J(f∗,D) ≤ 4d
2 log2(d/δ)
Λn2ǫ2p
. (51)
From Sridharan et al. (2008),
J¯(fpriv)− J¯(frtr) ≤ 2(J(fpriv,D)− J(f∗,D)) +O
(
log(1/δ)
Λn
)
(52)
≤ 8d
2 log2(d/δ)
Λn2ǫ2p
+O
(
log(1/δ)
Λn
)
. (53)
By definition of f∗, we have J¯(frtr)− J¯(f0) ≤ 0. If Λ is set to be ǫg||f0||2 , then, the fourth quantity
in Equation 49 is at most
ǫg
2 . The theorem follows by solving for n to make the total excess error
at most ǫg.
The following lemma is analogous to Lemma 3, and it establishes a bound on the distance
between the output of Algorithm 2, and non-private regularized ERM. We note that this bound
holds when Algorithm 2 has ǫ′p > 0, that is, when ∆ = 0. Ensuring that ∆ = 0 requires an
additional condition on n, which is stated in Theorem 4.
Lemma 5. Let ǫ′p > 0. Let f
∗ = argmin J(f ,D), and let fpriv be the classifier output by Algorithm
2. If N(·) is 1-strongly convex and globally differentiable, and if ℓ is convex and differentiable at
all points, with |ℓ′(z)| ≤ 1 for all z, then
Pb
(
J(fpriv,D) ≤ J(f∗,D) + 4d
2 log2(d/δ)
Λn2ǫ2p
)
≥ 1− δ, (54)
where the probability is taken over the randomness in the noise b of Algorithm 2.
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Proof. By the assumption ǫ′p > 0, the classifier fpriv minimizes the objective function J(f ,D)+ 1nbT f ,
and therefore
J(fpriv,D) ≤ J(f∗,D) + 1
n
bT (f∗ − fpriv). (55)
First, we try to bound ||f∗ − fpriv||. Recall that ΛN(·) is Λ-strongly convex and globally differen-
tiable, and ℓ is convex and differentiable. We can therefore apply Lemma 1 with G(f) = J(f ,D)
and g(f) = 1nb
T f to obtain the bound
||f∗ − fpriv|| ≤ 1
Λ
∥∥∥∥∇( 1nbT f)
∥∥∥∥ ≤ ||b||nΛ . (56)
Therefore by the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality,
J(fpriv,D)− J(f∗,D) ≤ ||b||
2
n2Λ
. (57)
Since ||b|| is drawn from a Γ(d, 2ǫp ) distribution, from Lemma 4, with probability 1 − δ, ||b|| ≤
2d log(d/δ)
ǫp
. The Lemma follows by plugging this in to the previous equation.
4.3 Applications
In this section, we examine the sample requirement of privacy-preserving regularized logistic re-
gression and support vector machines. Recall that in both these cases, N(f) = 12 ||f ||2.
Corollary 5 (Logistic Regression). Let training data D be generated i.i.d. according to a distribu-
tion P and let f0 be a classifier with expected loss L(f0) = L
∗. Let the loss function ℓ = ℓLR defined
in Section 3.4.1. Then the following two statements hold:
1. There exists a C1 such that if
n > C1max
(
||f0||2 log(1δ )
ǫ2g
,
d log(dδ )||f0||
ǫgǫp
,
d log(dδ )||f0||2
ǫ
3/2
g ǫp
)
, (58)
then the output fpriv of Algorithm 1 satisfies
P (L(fpriv) ≤ L∗ + ǫg) ≥ 1− δ. (59)
2. There exists a C2 such that if
n > Cmax
(
||f0||2 log(1/δ)
ǫ2g
,
||f0||2
ǫgǫp
,
d log(dδ )||f0||
ǫgǫp
)
, (60)
then the output fpriv of Algorithm 2 with c =
1
4 satisfies
P (L(fpriv) ≤ L∗ + ǫg) ≥ 1− δ. (61)
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Proof. Since ℓLR is convex and doubly differentiable for any z1, z2,
ℓ′LR(z1)− ℓ′LR(z2) ≤ ℓ′′LR(z∗)(z1 − z2) (62)
for some z∗ ∈ [z1, z2]. Moreover, |ℓ′′LR(z∗)| ≤ c = 14 , so ℓ′ is 14 -Lipschitz. The corollary now follows
from Theorems 3 and 4.
For SVMs we state results with ℓ = ℓHuber, but a similar bound can be shown for ℓs as well.
Corollary 6 (Huber Support Vector Machines). Let training data D be generated i.i.d. according
to a distribution P and let f0 be a classifier with expected loss L(f0) = L
∗. Let the loss function
ℓ = ℓHuber defined in (23). Then the following two statements hold:
1. There exists a C1 such that if
n > C1max
(
||f0||2 log(1δ )
ǫ2g
,
d log(dδ )||f0||
ǫgǫp
,
d log(dδ )||f0||2
h1/2ǫ
3/2
g ǫp
)
, (63)
then the output fpriv of Algorithm 1 satisfies
P (L(fpriv) ≤ L∗ + ǫg) ≥ 1− δ. (64)
2. There exists a C2 such that if
n > Cmax
(
||f0||2 log(1/δ)
ǫ2g
,
||f0||2
hǫgǫp
,
d log(dδ )||f0||
ǫgǫp
)
, (65)
then the output fpriv of Algorithm 2 with c =
1
4 satisfies
P (L(fpriv) ≤ L∗ + ǫg) ≥ 1− δ. (66)
Proof. The Huber loss is convex and differentiable with continuous derivatives. Moreover, since
the derivative of the Huber loss is piecewise linear with slope 0 or at most 12h , for any z1, z2,
|ℓ′Huber(z1)− ℓ′Huber(z2)| ≤
1
2h
|z1 − z2|, (67)
so ℓ′Huber is
1
2h -Lipschitz. The first part of the corollary follows from Theorem 3.
For the second part of the corollary, we observe that from Corollary 4, we do not need ℓ to
be globally double differentiable, and the bound on |ℓ′′(z)| in Theorem 4 is only needed to ensure
that ǫ′p > 0; since ℓHuber is double differentiable except in a set of Lebesgue measure 0, with
|ℓ′′Huber(z)| ≤ 12h , the corollary follows by an application of Theorem 4.
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5 Kernel methods
A powerful methodology in learning problems is the “kernel trick,” which allows the efficient con-
struction of a predictor f that lies in a reproducing kernel Hilbert space (RKHS) H associated to
a positive definite kernel function k(·, ·). The representer theorem (Kimeldorf and Wahba, 1970)
shows that the regularized empirical risk in (1) is minimized by a function f(x) that is given by a
linear combination of kernel functions centered at the data points:
f∗(x) =
n∑
i=1
aik(x(i),x). (68)
This elegant result is important for both theoretical and computational reasons. Computationally,
one releases the values ai corresponding to the f that minimizes the empirical risk, along with the
data points x(i); the user classifies a new x by evaluating the function in (68).
A crucial difficulty in terms of privacy is that this directly releases the private values x(i) of
some individuals in the training set. Thus, even if the classifier is computed in a privacy-preserving
way, any classifier released by this process requires revealing the data. We provide an algorithm
that avoids this problem, using an approximation method (Rahimi and Recht, 2007, 2008b) to
approximate the kernel function using random projections.
5.1 Mathematical preliminaries
Our approach works for kernel functions which are translation invariant, so k(x,x′) = k(x − x′).
The key idea in the random projection method is from Bochner’s Theorem, which states that a
continuous translation invariant kernel is positive definite if and only if it is the Fourier transform
of a nonnegative measure. This means that the Fourier transform K(θ) of translation-invariant
kernel function k(t) can be normalized so that K¯(θ) = K(θ)/ ‖K(θ)‖1 is a probability measure on
the transform space Θ. We will assume K¯(θ) is uniformly bounded over θ.
In this representation
k(x,x′) =
∫
Θ
φ(x; θ)φ(x′; θ)K¯(θ)dθ, (69)
where we will assume the feature functions φ(x; θ) are bounded:
|φ(x; θ)| ≤ ζ ∀x ∈ X , ∀θ ∈ Θ. (70)
A function f ∈ H can be written as
f(x) =
∫
Θ
a(θ)φ(x; θ)K¯(θ)dθ. (71)
To prove our generalization bounds we must show that bounded classifiers f induce bounded func-
tions a(θ). Writing the evaluation functional as an inner product with k(x,x′) and (69) shows
f(x) =
∫
Θ
(∫
X
f(x′)φ(x′; θ)dx′
)
φ(x; θ)K¯(θ)dθ. (72)
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Thus we have
a(θ) =
∫
X
f(x′)φ(x′; θ)dx′ (73)
|a(θ)| ≤ Vol(X ) · ζ · ‖f‖∞ . (74)
This shows that a(θ) is bounded uniformly over Θ when f(x) is bounded uniformly over X . The
volume of the unit ball is Vol(X ) = πd/2
Γ(d
2
+1)
(see Ball (1997) for more details). For large d this is
(
√
2πe
d )
d by Stirling’s formula. Furthermore, we have
‖f‖2H =
∫
Θ
a(θ)2K¯(θ)dθ. (75)
5.2 A reduction to the linear case
We now describe how to apply Algorithms 1 and 2 for classification with kernels, by transforming to
linear classification. Given {θj}, let R : X → RD be the map that sends x(i) to a vector v(i) ∈ RD
where vj(i) = φ(x(i); θj) for j ∈ [D]. We then use Algorithm 1 or Algorithm 2 to compute a
privacy-preserving linear classifier f in RD. The algorithm releases R and f˜ . The overall classifier
is fpriv(x) = f˜(R(x)).
Algorithm 3 Private ERM for nonlinear kernels
Inputs: Data {(xi, yi) : i ∈ [n]}, positive definite kernel function k(·, ·), sampling function K¯(θ),
parameters ǫp, Λ, D
Outputs: Predictor fpriv and pre-filter {θj : j ∈ [D]}.
Draw {θj : j = 1, 2, . . . ,D} iid according to K¯(θ).
Set v(i) =
√
2/D[φ(x(i); θ1) · · · φ(x(i); θD)]T for each i.
Run Algorithm 1 or Algorithm 2 with data {(v(i), y(i))} and parameters ǫp, Λ.
As an example, consider the Gaussian kernel
k(x,x′) = exp
(
−γ ∥∥x− x′∥∥2
2
)
. (76)
The Fourier transform of a Gaussian is a Gaussian, so we can sample θj = (ω,ψ) according to the
distribution Uniform[−π, π] × N (0, 2γId) and compute vj = cos(ωTx + ψ). The random phase is
used to produce a real-valued mapping. The paper of Rahimi and Recht (2008a) has more examples
of transforms for other kernel functions.
5.3 Privacy guarantees
Because the workhorse of Algorithm 3 is a differentially-private version of ERM for linear classifiers
(either Algorithm 1 or Algorithm 2), and the points {θj : j ∈ [D]} are independent of the data, the
privacy guarantees for Algorithm 3 follow trivially from Theorems 1 and 2.
Theorem 5. Given data {(x(i), y(i)) : i = 1, 2, . . . , n} with (x(i), y(i)) and ‖x(i)‖ ≤ 1, the outputs
(fpriv, {θj : j ∈ [D]}) of Algorithm 3 guarantee ǫp-differential privacy.
The proof trivially follows from a combination of Theorems 1, 2, and the fact that the θj’s are
drawn independently of the input dataset.
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5.4 Generalization performance
We now turn to generalization bounds for Algorithm 3. We will prove results using objective per-
turbation (Algorithm 2) in Algorithm 3, but analogous results for output perturbation (Algorithm
1) are simple to prove. Our comparisons will be against arbitrary predictors f0 whose norm is
bounded in some sense. That is, given an f0 with some properties, we will choose regularization
parameter Λ, dimension D, and number of samples n so that the predictor fpriv has expected loss
close to that of f0.
In this section we will assume N(f) = 12 ‖f‖2 so that N(·) is 1-strongly convex, and that the
loss function ℓ is convex, differentiable and |ℓ′(z)| ≤ 1 for all z.
Our first generalization result is the simplest, since it assumes a strong condition that gives
easy guarantees on the projections. We would like the predictor produced by Algorithm 3 to be
competitive against an f0 such that
f0(x) =
∫
Θ
a0(θ)φ(x; θ)K¯(θ)dθ, (77)
and |a0(θ)| ≤ C (see Rahimi and Recht (2008b)). Our first result provides the technical building
block for our other generalization results. The proof makes use of ideas from Rahimi and Recht
(2008b) and techniques from Sridharan et al. (2008); Shalev-Shwartz and Srebro (2008).
Lemma 6. Let f0 be a predictor such that |a0(θ)| ≤ C, for all θ, where a0(θ) is given by (77),
and suppose L(f0) = L
∗. Moreover, suppose that ℓ′(·) is c-Lipschitz. If the data D is drawn i.i.d.
according to P , then there exists a constant C0 such that if
n > C0 ·max
(
C2
√
log(1/δ)
ǫpǫ2g
· log C log(1/δ)
ǫgδ
,
cǫg
ǫp log(1/δ)
)
, (78)
then Λ and D can be chosen such that the output fpriv of Algorithm 3 using Algorithm 2 satisfies
P (L(fpriv)− L∗ ≤ ǫg) ≥ 1− 4δ. (79)
Proof. Since |a0(θ)| ≤ C and the K¯(θ) is bounded, we have (Rahimi and Recht, 2008b, Theorem
1) that with probability 1− 2δ there exists an fp ∈ RD such that
L(fp) ≤ L(f0) +O
((
1√
n
+
1√
D
)
C
√
log
1
δ
)
, (80)
We will choose D to make this loss small. Furthermore, fp is guaranteed to have ‖fp‖∞ ≤ C/D, so
‖fp‖22 ≤
C2
D
. (81)
Now given such an fp we must show that fpriv will have true risk close to that of fp as long as
there are enough data points. This can be shown using the techniques in Shalev-Shwartz and Srebro
(2008). Let
J¯(f) = L(f) +
Λ
2
‖f‖22 ,
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and let
frtr = argmin
f∈RD
J¯(f)
minimize the regularized true risk. Then
J¯(fpriv) = J¯(fp) + (J¯(fpriv)− J¯(frtr)) + (J¯(frtr)− J¯(fp)).
Now, since J¯(·) is minimized by frtr, the last term is negative and we can disregard it. Then we
have
L(fpriv)− L(fp) ≤ (J¯(fpriv)− J¯(frtr)) + Λ
2
‖fp‖22 −
Λ
2
‖fpriv‖22 . (82)
From Lemma 5, with probability at least 1− δ over the noise b,
J(fpriv)− J
(
argmin
f
J(f)
)
≤ 4D
2 log2(D/δ)
Λn2ǫ2p
. (83)
Now using (Sridharan et al., 2008, Corollary 2), we can bound the term (J¯(fpriv)− J¯(frtr)) by twice
the gap in the regularized empirical risk difference (83) plus an additional term. That is, with
probability 1− δ:
J¯(fpriv)− J¯(frtr) ≤ 2(J(fpriv)− J(frtr)) +O
(
log(1/δ)
Λn
)
. (84)
If we set n > c4ǫpΛ , then ǫ
′
p > 0, and we can plug Lemma 5 into (84) to obtain:
J¯(fpriv)− J¯(frtr) ≤ 8D
2 log2(D/δ)
Λn2ǫ2p
+O
(
log(1/δ)
Λn
)
. (85)
Plugging (85) into (82), discarding the negative term involving ‖fpriv‖22 and setting Λ = ǫg/ ‖fp‖2
gives
L(fpriv)− L(fp) ≤
8 ‖fp‖22D2 log2(D/δ)
n2ǫ2pǫg
+O
(
‖fp‖22 log 1δ
nǫg
)
+
ǫg
2
. (86)
Now we have, using (80) and (86), that with probability 1− 4δ:
L(fpriv)− L(f0) ≤ (L(fpriv)− L(fp)) + (L(fp)− L(f0))
≤ 8 ‖fp‖
2
2D
2 log2(D/δ)
n2ǫ2pǫg
+O
(
‖fp‖22 log(1/δ)
nǫg
)
+
ǫg
2
+O
((
1√
n
+
1√
D
)
C
√
log
1
δ
)
,
Substituting (81), we have
L(fpriv)− L(f0) ≤ 8C
2D log2(D/δ)
n2ǫ2pǫg
+O
(
C2 log(1/δ)
Dnǫg
)
+
ǫg
2
+O
((
1√
n
+
1√
D
)
C
√
log
1
δ
)
.
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To set the remaining parameters, we will choose D < n so that
L(fpriv)− L(f0) ≤ 8C
2D log2(D/δ)
n2ǫ2pǫg
+O
(
C2 log(1/δ)
Dnǫg
)
+
ǫg
2
+O
(
C
√
log(1/δ)√
D
)
.
We set D = O(C2 log(1/δ)/ǫ2g) to make the last term ǫg/6, and:
L(fpriv)− L(f0) ≤ O

C4 log 1δ log2 C
2 log(1/δ)
ǫ2gδ
n2ǫ2pǫ
3
g

+O (ǫg
n
)
+
2ǫg
3
.
Setting n as in (78) proves the result. Moreover, setting n >
c‖fp‖
2
4ǫpǫg
= C0 · cǫgǫp log(1/δ) ensures that
n > c4Λǫp .
We can adapt the proof procedure to show that Algorithm 3 is competitive against any clas-
sifier f0 with a given bound on ‖f0‖∞. It can be shown that for some constant ζ that |a0(θ)| ≤
Vol(X )ζ ‖f0‖∞. Then we can set this as C in (78) to obtain the following result.
Theorem 6. Let f0 be a classifier with norm ‖f0‖∞, and let ℓ′(·) be c-Lipschitz. Then for any
distribution P , there exists a constant C0 such that if
n > C0 ·max
(
‖f0‖2∞ ζ2(Vol(X ))2
√
log(1/δ)
ǫpǫ2g
· log ‖f0‖∞Vol(X )ζ log(1/δ)
ǫgδΓ(
d
2 + 1)
,
cǫg
ǫp log(1/δ)
)
, (87)
then Λ and D can be chosen such that the output fpriv of Algorithm 3 with Algorithm 2 satisfies
P (L(fpriv)− L(f0) ≤ ǫg) ≥ 1− 4δ.
Proof. Substituting C = Vol(X )ζ ‖f0‖∞ in Lemma 6 we get the result.
We can also derive a generalization result with respect to classifiers with bounded ‖f0‖H.
Theorem 7. Let f0 be a classifier with norm ‖f0‖H, and let ℓ′ be c-Lipschitz. Then for any
distribution P , there exists a constant C0 such that if,
n = C0 ·max
(
‖f0‖4H ζ2(Vol(X ))2
√
log(1/δ)
ǫpǫ4g
· log ‖f0‖HVol(X )ζ log(1/δ)
ǫgδΓ(
d
2 + 1)
,
cǫg
ǫp log(1/δ)
)
, (88)
then Λ and D can be chosen such that the output of Algorithm 3 run with Algorithm 2 satisfies
P (L(fpriv)− L(f0) ≤ ǫg) ≥ 1− 4δ.
Proof. Let f0 be a classifier with norm ‖f0‖2H and expected loss L(f0). Now consider
frtr = argmin
f
L(f) +
Λrtr
2
‖f‖2H ,
for some Λrtr to be specified later. We will first need a bound on ‖frtr‖∞ in order to use our previous
sample complexity results. Since frtr is a minimizer, we can take the derivative of the regularized
expected loss and set it to 0 to get:
frtr(x
′) =
−1
Λrtr
(
∂
∂f
∫
X
ℓ(f(x′), y)dP (x, y)
)
=
−1
Λrtr
(∫
X
(
∂
∂f(x′)
ℓ(f(x), y)
)
·
(
∂
∂f(x′)
f(x)
)
dP (x, y)
)
,
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where P (x, y) is a distribution on pairs (x, y). Now, using the representer theorem, ∂∂f(x′) f(x) =
k(x′,x). Since the kernel function is bounded and the derivative of the loss is always upper bounded
by 1, so the integrand can be upper bounded by a constant. Since P (x, y) is a probability distri-
bution, we have for all x′ that |frtr(x′)| = O(1/Λrtr). Now we set Λrtr = ǫg/ ‖f0‖2H to get
‖frtr‖∞ = O
(
‖f0‖2H
ǫg
)
.
We now have two cases to consider, depending on whether L(f0) < L(frtr) or L(f0) > L(frtr).
Case 1: Suppose that L(f0) < L(frtr). Then by the definition of frtr,
L(frtr) +
ǫg
2
· ‖frtr‖
2
H
‖f0‖2H
≤ L(f0) + ǫg
2
.
Since
ǫg
2 ·
‖frtr‖
2
H
‖f0‖
2
H
≥ 0, we have L(frtr)− L(f0) ≤ ǫg2 .
Case 2: Suppose that L(f0) > L(frtr). Then the regularized classifier has better generalization
performance than the original, so we have trivially that L(frtr)− L(f0) ≤ ǫg2 .
Therefore in both cases we have a bound on ‖frtr‖∞ and a generalization gap of ǫg/2. We can
now apply Theorem 6 to show that for n satisfying (87) we have
P (L(fpriv)− L(f0) ≤ ǫg) ≥ 1− 4δ.
6 Parameter tuning
The privacy-preserving learning algorithms presented so far in this paper assume that the regular-
ization constant Λ is provided as an input, and is independent of the data. In actual applications
of ERM, Λ is selected based on the data itself. In this section, we address this issue: how to design
an ERM algorithm with end-to-end privacy, which selects Λ based on the data itself.
Our solution is to present a privacy-preserving parameter tuning technique that is applicable
in general machine learning algorithms, beyond ERM. In practice, one typically tunes parameters
(such as the regularization parameter Λ) as follows: using data held out for validation, train
predictors f(·; Λ) for multiple values of Λ, and select the one which provides the best empirical
performance. However, even though the output of an algorithm preserves ǫp-differential privacy for
a fixed Λ (as is the case with Algorithms 1 and 2), by choosing a Λ based on empirical performance
on a validation set may violate ǫp-differential privacy guarantees. That is, if the procedure that
picks Λ is not private, then an adversary may use the released classifier to infer the value of Λ and
therefore something about the values in the database.
We suggest two ways of resolving this issue. First, if we have access to a smaller publicly
available data from the same distribution, then we can use this as a holdout set to tune Λ. This
Λ can be subsequently used to train a classifier on the private data. Since the value of Λ does
not depend on the values in the private data set, this procedure will still preserve the privacy of
individuals in the private data.
If no such public data is available, then we need a differentially private tuning procedure. We
provide such a procedure below. The main idea is to train for different values of Λ on separate
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subsets of the training dataset, so that the total training procedure still maintains ǫp-differential
privacy. We score each of these predictors on a validation set, and choose a Λ (and hence f(·; Λ))
using a randomized privacy-preserving comparison procedure (McSherry and Talwar, 2007). The
last step is needed to guarantee ǫp-differential privacy for individuals in the validation set. This
final algorithm provides an end-to-end guarantee of differential privacy, and renders our privacy-
preserving ERM procedure complete. We observe that both these procedures can be used for tuning
multiple parameters as well.
6.1 Tuning algorithm
Algorithm 4 Privacy-preserving parameter tuning
Inputs: Database D, parameters {Λ1, . . . ,Λm}, ǫp.
Outputs: Parameter fpriv.
Divide D into m+ 1 equal portions D1, . . . ,Dm+1, each of size |D|m+1 .
For each i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, apply a privacy-preserving learning algorithm (e.g. Algorithms 1, 2, or
3) on Di with parameter Λi and ǫp to get output fi.
Evaluate zi, the number of mistakes made by fi on Dm+1. Set fpriv = fi with probability
qi =
e−ǫpzi/2∑m
i=1 e
−ǫpzi/2
. (89)
We note that the list of potential Λ values input to this procedure should not be a function of
the private dataset. It can be shown that the empirical error on Dm+1 of the classifier output by
this procedure is close to the empirical error of the best classifier in the set {f1, . . . , fm} on Dm+1,
provided |D| is high enough.
6.2 Privacy and utility
Theorem 8. The output of the tuning procedure of Algorithm 4 is ǫp-differentially private.
Proof. To show that Algorithm 4 preserves ǫp-differential privacy, we first consider an alternative
procedureM. Let M be the procedure that releases the values (f1, . . . , fm, i) where, f1, . . . , fm are
the intermediate values computed in the second step of Algorithm 4, and i is the index selected by
the exponential mechanism step. We first show that M preserves ǫp-differential privacy.
Let D and D′ be two datasets that differ in the value of one individual such that D = D¯∪{(x, y)},
and D′ = D¯ ∪ {(x′, y′)}.
Recall that the datasets D1, . . . ,Dm+1 are disjoint; moreover, the randomness in the privacy
mechanisms are independent. Therefore,
P (f1 ∈ S1, . . . , fm ∈ Sm, i = i∗|D)
=
∫
S1×...Sm
P (i = i∗|f1, . . . , fm,Dm+1)µ(f1, . . . , fm|D)df1 . . . dfm
=
∫
S1×...Sm
P (i = i∗|f1, . . . , fm,Dm+1)
m∏
j=1
µj(fj |Dj)df1 . . . dfm, (90)
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where µj(f) is the density at f induced by the classifier run with parameter Λj, and µ(f1, . . . , fm) is
the joint density at f1, . . . , fm, induced by M. Now suppose that (x, y) ∈ Dj , for j = m+1. Then,
Dk = D′k, and µj(fj |Dj) = µj(fj |D′j), for k ∈ [m]. Moreover, given any fixed set f1, . . . , fm,
P
(
i = i∗|D′m+1, f1, . . . , fm
) ≤ eǫpP (i = i∗|Dm+1, f1, . . . , fm) . (91)
Instead, if (x, y) ∈ Dj , for j ∈ [m], then, Dk = D′k, for k ∈ [m + 1], k 6= j. Thus, for a fixed
f1, . . . , fm,
P
(
i = i∗|D′m+1, f1, . . . , fm
)
= P (i = i∗|Dm+1, f1, . . . , fm) (92)
µk(fk|Dk) ≤ eǫpµk(fk|D′k). (93)
The lemma follows by combining (90)-(93).
Now, an adversary who has access to the output of M can compute the output of Algorithm
4 itself, without any further access to the dataset. Therefore, by a simulatibility argument, as
in Dwork et al. (2006b), Algorithm 4 also preserves ǫp-differential privacy.
In the theorem above, we assume that the individual algorithms for privacy-preserving classifi-
cation satisfy Definition 2; a similar theorem can also be shown when they satisfy a guarantee as
in Corollary 4.
The following theorem shows that the empirical error on DK+1 of the classifier output by the
tuning procedure is close to the empirical error of the best classifier in the set {f1, . . . , fK}. The
proof of this Theorem follows from Lemma 7 of McSherry and Talwar (2007).
Theorem 9. Let zmin = mini zi, and let z be the number of mistakes made on Dm+1 by the classifier
output by our tuning procedure. Then, with probability 1− δ,
z ≤ zmin + 2 log(m/δ)
ǫp
. (94)
Proof. In the notation of McSherry and Talwar (2007), the zmin = OPT , the base measure µ is
uniform on [m], and St = {i : zi < zmin + t}. Their Lemma 7 shows that
P
(
S¯2t
) ≤ exp(−ǫpt)
µ(St)
, (95)
where µ is the uniform measure on [m]. Using minµ(St) =
1
m to upper bound the right side and
setting it equal to δ we obtain
t =
1
ǫp
log
m
δ
. (96)
From this we have
P
(
z ≥ zmin + 2
ǫp
log
m
δ
)
≤ δ, (97)
and the result follows.
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7 Experiments
In this section we give experimental results for training linear classifiers with Algorithms 1 and 2
on two real datasets. Imposing privacy requirements necessarily degrades classifier performance.
Our experiments show that provided there is sufficient data, objective perturbation (Algorithm
2) typically outperforms the sensitivity method (1) significantly, and achieves error rate close to
that of the analogous non-private ERM algorithm. We first demonstrate how the accuracy of the
classification algorithms vary with ǫp, the privacy requirement. We then show how the performance
of privacy-preserving classification varies with increasing training data size.
The first dataset we consider is the Adult dataset from the UCI Machine Learning Repository
(Asuncion and Newman, 2007). This moderately-sized dataset contains demographic information
about approximately 47, 000 individuals, and the classification task is to predict whether the annual
income of an individual is below or above $50,000, based on variables such as age, sex, occupation,
and education. For our experiments, the average fraction of positive labels is about 0.25; therefore,
a trivial classifier that always predicts −1 will achieve this error-rate, and only error-rates below
0.25 are interesting.
The second dataset we consider is the KDDCup99 dataset (Hettich and Bay, 1999); the task here
is to predict whether a network connection is a denial-of-service attack or not, based on several
attributes. The dataset includes about 5,000,000 instances. For this data the average fraction of
positive labels is 0.20.
In order to implement the convex minimization procedure, we use the convex optimization
library provided by Okazaki (2009).
7.1 Preprocessing
In order to process the Adult dataset into a form amenable for classification, we removed all entries
with missing values, and converted each categorial attribute to a binary vector. For example, an
attribute such as (Male,Female)was converted into 2 binary features. Each column was normalized
to ensure that the maximum value is 1, and then each row is normalized to ensure that the norm of
any example is at most 1. After preprocessing, each example was represented by a 105-dimensional
vector, of norm at most 1.
For the KDDCup99 dataset, the instances were preprocessed by converting each categorial at-
tribute to a binary vector. Each column was normalized to ensure that the maximum value is 1,
and finally, each row was normalized, to ensure that the norm of any example is at most 1. After
preprocessing, each example was represented by a 119-dimensional vector, of norm at most 1.
7.2 Privacy-Accuracy Tradeoff
For our first set of experiments, we study the tradeoff between the privacy requirement on the
classifier, and its classification accuracy, when the classifier is trained on data of a fixed size. The
privacy requirement is quantified by the value of ǫp; increasing ǫp implies a higher change in the
belief of the adversary when one entry in D changes, and thus lower privacy. To measure accuracy,
we use classification (test) error; namely, the fraction of times the classifier predicts a label with
the wrong sign.
To study the privacy-accuracy tradeoff, we compare objective perturbation with the sensitivity
method for logistic regression and Huber SVM. For Huber SVM, we picked the Huber constant
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Figure 2: Privacy-Accuracy trade-off for the Adult dataset
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(a) Regularized logistic regression, KDDCup99
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Figure 3: Privacy-Accuracy trade-off for the KDDCup99 dataset
h = 0.5, a typical value (Chapelle, 2007)1. For each data set we trained classifiers for a few fixed
values of Λ and tested the error of these classifiers. For each algorithm we chose the value of Λ that
minimizes the error-rate for ǫp = 0.1.
2 We then plotted the error-rate against ǫp for the chosen
value of Λ. The results are shown in Figures 2 and 3 for both logistic regression and support vector
machines3. The optimal values of Λ are shown in Tables 1 and 2. For non-private logistic regression
and SVM, each presented error-rate is an average over 10-fold cross-validation; for the sensitivity
method as well as objective perturbation, the presented error-rate is an average over 10-fold cross-
validation and 50 runs of the randomized training procedure. For Adult, the privacy-accuracy
tradeoff is computed over the entire dataset, which consists of 45, 220 examples; for KDDCup99 we
1Chapelle (2007) recommends using h between 0.01 and 0.5; we use h = 0.5 as we found that a higher value
typically leads to more numerical stability, as well as better performance for both privacy-preserving methods.
2For KDDCup99 the error of the non-private algorithms did not increase with decreasing Λ.
3The slight kink in the SVM curve on Adult is due to a switch to the second phase of the algorithm.
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Λ 10−10.0 10−7.0 10−4.0 10−3.5 10−3.0 10−2.5 10−2.0 10−1.5
Logistic
Non-Private 0.1540 0.1533 0.1654 0.1694 0.1758 0.1895 0.2322 0.2478
Output 0.5318 0.5318 0.5175 0.4928 0.4310 0.3163 0.2395 0.2456
Objective 0.8248 0.8248 0.8248 0.2694 0.2369 0.2161 0.2305 0.2475
Huber
Non-Private 0.1527 0.1521 0.1632 0.1669 0.1719 0.1793 0.2454 0.2478
Output 0.5318 0.5318 0.5211 0.5011 0.4464 0.3352 0.2376 0.2476
Objective 0.2585 0.2585 0.2585 0.2582 0.2559 0.2046 0.2319 0.2478
Table 1: Error for different regularization parameters on Adult for ǫp = 0.1. The best error per
algorithm is in bold.
Λ 10−9.0 10−7.0 10−5.0 10−3.5 10−3.0 10−2.5 10−2.0 10−1.5
Logistic
Non-Private 0.0016 0.0016 0.0021 0.0038 0.0037 0.0037 0.0325 0.0594
Output 0.5245 0.5245 0.5093 0.3518 0.1114 0.0359 0.0304 0.0678
Objective 0.2084 0.2084 0.2084 0.0196 0.0118 0.0113 0.0285 0.0591
Huber
Non-Private 0.0013 0.0013 0.0013 0.0029 0.0051 0.0056 0.0061 0.0163
Output 0.5245 0.5245 0.5229 0.4611 0.3353 0.0590 0.0092 0.0179
Objective 0.0191 0.0191 0.0191 0.1827 0.0123 0.0066 0.0064 0.0157
Table 2: Error for different regularization parameters on KDDCup99 for ǫp = 0.1. The best error per
algorithm is in bold.
use a randomly chosen subset of 70, 000 examples.
For the Adult dataset, the constant classifier that classifies all examples to be negative acheives
a classification error of about 0.25. The sensitivity method thus does slightly better than this con-
stant classifier for most values of ǫp for both logistic regression and support vector machines. Objec-
tive perturbation outperforms sensitivity, and objective perturbation for support vector machines
achieves lower classification error than objective perturbation for logistic regression. Non-private
logistic regression and support vector machines both have classification error about 0.15.
For the KDDCup99 dataset, the constant classifier that classifies all examples as negative, has
error 0.19. Again, objective perturbation outperforms sensitivity for both logistic regression and
support vector machines; however, for SVM and high values of ǫp (low privacy), the sensitivity
method performs almost as well as objective perturbation. In the low privacy regime, logistic
regression under objective perturbation is better than support vector machines. In contrast, in
the high privacy regime (low ǫp), support vector machines with objective perturbation outperform
logistic regression. For this dataset, non-private logistic regression and support vector machines
both have a classification error of about 0.001.
For SVMs on both Adult and KDDCup99, for large ǫp (0.25 onwards), the error of either of the
private methods can increase slightly with increasing ǫp. This seems counterintuitive, but appears
to be due the imbalance in fraction of the two labels. As the labels are imbalanced, the optimal
classifier is trained to perform better on the negative labels than the positives. As ǫp increases, for
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a fixed training data size, so does the perturbation from the optimal classifier, induced by either of
the private methods. Thus, as the perturbation increases, the number of false positives increases,
whereas the number of false negatives decreases (as we verified by measuring the average false
positive and false negative rates of the private classifiers). Therefore, the total error may increase
slightly with decreasing privacy.
7.3 Accuracy vs. Training Data Size Tradeoffs
Next we examine how classification accuracy varies as we increase the size of the training set. We
measure classification accuracy as the accuracy of the classifier produced by the tuning procedure
in Section 6. As the Adult dataset is not sufficiently large to allow us to do privacy-preserving
tuning, for these experiments, we restrict our attention to the KDDCup99 dataset.
Figures 4 and 5 present the learning curves for objective perturbation, non-private ERM and
the sensitivity method for logistic loss and Huber loss, respectively. Experiments are shown for
ǫp = 0.01 and ǫp = 0.05 for both loss functions. The training sets (for each of 5 values of Λ) are
chosen to be of size n = 60, 000 to n = 120, 000, and the validation and test sets each are of size
25, 000. Each presented value is an average over 5 random permutations of the data, and 50 runs
of the randomized classification procedure. For objective perturbation we performed experiment in
the regime when ǫ′p > 0, so ∆ = 0 in Algorithm 2.
4
For non-private ERM, we present result for training sets from n = 300, 000 to n = 600, 000.
The non-private algorithms are tuned by comparing 5 values of Λ on the same training set, and
the test set is of size 25, 000. Each reported value is an average over 5 random permutations of the
data.
We see from the figures that for non-private logistic regression and support vector machines,
the error remains constant with increasing data size. For the private methods, the error usually
decreases as the data size increases. In all cases, objective perturbation outperforms the sensitivity
method, and support vector machines generally outperform logistic regression.
6 7 8 9 10 11 12
x 104
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
0.03
Training set size (εp = 0.05)
M
is
cl
as
si
fic
at
io
n 
er
ro
r r
at
e
 
 
Sensitivity LR
Objective LR
Non−Private LR
(a) ǫp = 0.05
6 7 8 9 10 11 12
x 104
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
Training set size (εp = 0.01)
M
is
cl
as
si
fic
at
io
n 
er
ro
r r
at
e
 
 
Sensitivity LR
Objective LR
Non−Private LR
(b) ǫp = 0.01
Figure 4: Learning curves for logistic regression on the KDDCup99 dataset
4This was chosen for a fair comparison with non-private as well as the output perturbation method, both of which
had access to only 5 values of Λ.
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Figure 5: Learning curves for SVM on the KDDCup99 dataset
8 Discussions and Conclusions
In this paper we study the problem of learning classifiers with regularized empirical risk mini-
mization in a privacy-preserving manner. We consider privacy in the ǫp-differential privacy model
of Dwork et al. (2006b) and provide two algorithms for privacy-preserving ERM. The first one is
based on the sensitivity method due to Dwork et al. (2006b), in which the output of the non-
private algorithm is perturbed by adding noise. We introduce a second algorithm based on the
new paradigm of objective perturbation. We provide bounds on the sample requirement of these
algorithms for achieving generalization error ǫg. We show how to apply these algorithms with ker-
nels, and finally, we provide experiments with both algorithms on two real datasets. Our work is,
to our knowledge, the first to propose computationally efficient classification algorithms satisfying
differential privacy, together with validation on standard data sets.
In general, for classification, the error rate increases as the privacy requirements are made more
stringent. Our generalization guarantees formalize this “price of privacy.” Our experiments, as well
as theoretical results, indicate that objective perturbation usually outperforms the sensitivity meth-
ods at managing the tradeoff between privacy and learning performance. Both algorithms perform
better with more training data, and when abundant training data is available, the performance of
both algorithms can be close to non-private classification.
The conditions on the loss function and regularizer required by output perturbation and ob-
jective perturbation are somewhat different. As Theorem 1 shows, output perturbation requires
strong convexity in the regularizer and convexity as well as a bounded derivative condition in the
loss function. The last condition can be replaced by a Lipschitz condition instead. However, the
other two conditions appear to be required, unless we impose some further restrictions on the loss
and regularizer. Objective perturbation on the other hand, requires strong convexity of the regular-
izer, convexity, differentiability, and bounded double derivatives in the loss function. Sometimes, it
is possible to construct a differentiable approximation to the loss function, even if the loss function
is not itself differentiable, as shown in Section 3.4.2.
Our experimental as well as theoretical results indicate that in general, objective perturbation
provides more accurate solutions than output perturbation. Thus, if the loss function satisfies the
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conditions of Theorem 2, we recommend using objective perturbation. In some situations, such
as for SVMs, it is possible that objective perturbation does not directly apply, but applies to an
approximation of the target loss function. In our experiments, the loss of statistical efficiency due
to such approximation has been small compared to the loss of efficiency due to privacy, and we
suspect that this is the case for many practical situations as well.
Finally, our work does not address the question of finding private solutions to regularized ERM
when the regularizer is not strongly convex. For example, neither the output perturbation, nor the
objective perturbation method work for L1-regularized ERM. However, in L1-regularized ERM,
one can find a dataset in which a change in one training point can significantly change the solution.
As a result, it is possible that such problems are inherently difficult to solve privately.
An open question in this work is to extend objective perturbation methods to more general
convex optimization problems. Currently, the objective perturbation method applies to strongly
convex regularization functions and differentiable losses. Convex optimization problems appear in
many contexts within and without machine learning: density estimation, resource allocation for
communication systems and networking, social welfare optimization in economics, and elsewhere.
In some cases these algorithms will also operate on sensitive or private data. Extending the ideas
and analysis here to those settings would provide a rigorous foundation for privacy analysis.
A second open question is to find a better solution for privacy-preserving classification with
kernels. Our current method is based on a reduction to the linear case, using the algorithm of
Rahimi and Recht (2008b); however, this method can be statistically inefficient, and require a lot
of training data, particularly when coupled with our privacy mechanism. The reason is that the
algorithm of Rahimi and Recht (2008b) requires the dimension D of the projected space to be very
high for good performance. However, most differentially-private algorithms perform worse as the
dimensionality of the data grows. Is there a better linearization method, which is possibly data-
dependent, that will provide a more statistically efficient solution to privacy-preserving learning
with kernels?
A final question is to provide better upper and lower bounds on the sample requirement of
privacy-preserving linear classification. The main open question here is to provide a computationally
efficient algorithm for linear classification which has better statistical efficiency.
Privacy-preserving machine learning is the endeavor of designing private analogues of widely
used machine learning algorithms. We believe the present study is a starting point for further
study of the differential privacy model in this relatively new subfield of machine learning. The
work of Dwork et al. (2006b) set up a framework for assessing the privacy risks associated with
publishing the results of data analyses. Demanding high privacy requires sacrificing utility, which in
the context of classification and prediction is excess loss or regret. In this paper we demonstrate the
privacy-utility tradeoff for ERM, which is but one corner of the machine learning world. Applying
these privacy concepts to other machine learning problems will lead to new and interesting tradeoffs
and towards a set of tools for practical privacy-preserving learning and inference. We hope that
our work provides a benchmark of the current price of privacy, and inspires improvements in future
work.
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